

Modernization, Cleavages and Voting Behavior in East Europe. An Analysis of Romanian Voting Behavior in Comparative Perspective

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Since 1989 many Eastern European transformation states have shown a tendency towards frequent changes of government and witnessed the defeat of ruling parties in elections. Such voting behavior may be traced back to various deficits in the interrelation between parties and voters. One of those deficits will be analyzed in this paper :

The respective parties lack a strong link with the population ; continuous (structural and functional) relations between parties and voters apparently do not exist.

The study of interrelations between political representatives and those represented and the subsequent idea of cleavages have been introduced into the electoral and party studies by Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset (1967) : Cleavages are societal conflicts that are transferred into political divisions and represented by particular parties (Eith 2001 ; Schmitt 2001). Rokkan and Lipset describe parties as the main „transmission belt” from group interests to political positions. Parties act on cleavages that stabilize the party system. They structure electoral preferences and develop long-term relationships with their voters, therefore allowing for stable majorities. If such ties are really missing in Eastern Europe or if they are not stable enough to produce reliable long-term voting behavior, the stability of newly established democratic systems may be at risk in the near future. Therefore, it is desirable and useful to (once again) systematically investigate the existence or non-existence of cleavages in Eastern Europe.

Theoretical Concept

According to democratic theory, the participation of citizens combined with the rule of law and the guarantee of freedom constitute the crucial criteria of democracy (Dahl, 1989, Vanhanen, 1990). There is no democracy without participation. In representative democracies elections are the most important form of participation.

The transfer of power from the people to the representatives establishes a power structure (*Herrschaftsverhältnis*) which draws

legitimation from the principle of the freedom of choice between candidates from different political groups. This leads to a limited rule that will be either suspended or reinstated periodically. *Thus, each representative democracy, which is the most common type of modern liberal democracies, depends on the voting behavior of its electorate.*

The principle of electoral choice offers genuine alternatives between several candidates and/or parties and ties the sphere of civil society to the political system – elections therefore serve as an expression of

preferences of particular interests and in turn produce particular party constellations (party systems). Political and social groups and parties as intermediary institutions assume the role of the “transmission belt” as described by Rokkan and Lipset – they structure the interests of the people, thus integrating them into the decision making process, they recruit political personnel and mandate office seekers to take part in the political engineering.

This role is based upon a symbiosis within representative democracy : on the one hand, the ruled try to assert their interest vis-à-vis the rulers, on the other hand parties must rely on popular support. Parties and voters mutually benefit from this interrelation : social groups facilitate their interests through representation and in return the parties gain support from the respective groups at the election polls.

Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset (1967) called this symbiosis of political groups and voters “*cleavages*” – societal conflicts that were transformed into political divisions and shaped the representation and the voting behavior of generations. Lipset and Rokkan deduced this structure of the European party systems of the 1960s from the societal conflicts of the early 1920s (“frozen party system”).

Berglund, Hellén, Aarebrot (1998, 10) define cleavages as more than “issues, conflicts and interests of a purely economic or social nature. They are in a sense more fundamental as they are founded on culture, value orientations and ideological insulation ; they constitute deep-seated socio-structural conflicts with political significance. A cleavage is rooted in a persistent social division which enables one to identify certain groups in society : members of an ethnic minority, believers of a particular denomination, and residents of a particular region. A cleavage also engages a certain set of values common to members of the group ; group members share the same value orientation. And finally, cleavages are institutionalized in the form of political parties and other associational groups.”

If the system of mutual use of votes, representation and power of representation is to work it requires a structured society, a feeling of relatedness between societal groups and their parties as well as success and durability of these parties within the political system.

Eastern European societies lack some of these components :

First some scholars criticize the low level of socio-economic differentiation which leads them to speak of “flattened societies” (e.g. Weßels, Klingemann, 1998 ; Delhey, 2001). Others identify „floating party systems” (e.g. Ilonszki, Kurtan, 1993) without any connection to its citizens. Furthermore, parties are claimed to have often “articulated only theoretical interests of social groups that did not exist at the time” (Berglund, Hellén, Aarebrot, 1998, 11) or they themselves initiated major shifts within the party system by splits, fragmentation or mergers as well as the deliberate breach of ruling coalitions (e.g. Poland).

Hence, the first question refers to the actual existence of cleavages in Eastern Europe :

Are there, after 1989, any cleavages in Eastern Europe which are suitable to explain a substantial part of the voting behavior of Eastern European constituencies ?

This question is fundamental and will be explored against the background of the modernization hypotheses for Eastern Europe :

Since 1989, Eastern Europe has followed a Western pattern of modernization¹. This process has led to a revitalization of cleavages but also to the subsequent adoption of Western European trends of individualization and dealignment.

Inglehart (1977, 1989, 1997) and Knutsen, Scarbrough (1995, quoted in Berglund, Hellén, Aarebrot, 1998, 11) translate modernization theory into the language of cleavages or voter-party-links and refer to these processes as “unfreezing party systems”, “new politics” which exist without cleavages, “politics without cleavages” or “post-cleavage conflicts”. These aspects of modernization raise further questions :

1. Which cleavages exist in Eastern European societies? (“traditional” cleavages, “new” cleavages)
2. Can we identify certain patterns of voting behavior and the extent of their impact on Eastern European societies? (cleavages, social structure, class, ideological structure)
And most importantly :
3. How do cleavages (“traditional”, “new” cleavages) relate to (and possibly explain) voting patterns and the structure of party systems in an European perspective ?

By understanding the European region as a cultural area, for which the original concept of cleavages was developed and discussed, my paper will offer some possible answers.

For that purpose, Eastern European countries, and especially Romania, will be contrasted with a Western European state, in this case Germany, to create a basis for comparison. The fundamental assumption of the research is the hypothesis that *cleavages are still relevant for Western European societies and are gaining importance in Eastern Europe* even though the relations between voters and parties in both parts of Europe may differ from expectations based on historical analysis. Four theses referring to the development of cleavages in the course of modernization offer an explanatory approach to the Eastern Europeans’ voting behavior :

a) Thesis of *continuity* :

The social structure and therefore also the basis of cleavages was preserved during the socialist era. Cleavages have a more important impact because they are pre-post-modern and there has been no dealignment caused by the value change in the 1960s and 1970s. Voting behavior in Eastern Europe is shaped by these “frozen” cleavage structures.

b) Thesis of new beginning or *discontinuity* :

Traditional cleavages (group consciousness) no longer exist. They are replaced by new cleavages as well as ideological cleavages that now determine voting behavior.

There are no cleavages in Eastern Europe because the societies are “flat” ; that means

“not structured” so far. The classic social strata are not yet established in Eastern Europe and people tend to vote according to short term needs and demands.

Both theses are equally based on the assumption that cleavages did not emerge during the socialist era.

c) Thesis of *dissolving* :

In the course of modernization processes, the impact of cleavages on voting behavior decreases, while volatility increases.

Modernization, pluralization and individualization dissolve cleavages. Their impact decreases in West Europe and remains weak in Eastern Europe. Volatility increases in Western Europe and remains high in Eastern Europe. Party identification dissolves in Western Europe and remains on the level of party affinity or *Lagerbildung* in Eastern Europe.

d) Thesis of *condensing* :

In the course of modernization processes, cleavages intensify and their impact on a social group’s voting behavior increases.

Cleavages intensify because pluralization of values and lifestyles produces hard-liners whose values and lifestyles are at risk. Within the ranks of hard-liners of competing social groups the impact of cleavages increases, while other parts of the society cast their ballot according to new or post-modern value orientations.

I will focus on the classical cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) – center periphery, church-state, land-industry, and labor-capital – and add an analysis of the impact of socio-structural variables and ideological values.

The analysis of cleavage structures and their effects across European countries requires a conceptual discussion and definition of the *cleavage* concept. I use the term cleavages to denote the linkage between voters and “their” parties according to the respective lines of conflict as well as the effectiveness of individual electoral choices on an aggregate level. I assume that cleavages develop and change during periods of modernization (frozen party systems vs. value change, see also Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994, 6).

To grasp the concept of *cleavages* in its functional and structural aspects, I will name :

a) a conflict in (civil) society which is not yet permanently transferred into the political sphere, meaning that it is not permanently represented by one party (or the faction of a party) as a *latent cleavage*.

b) a societal conflict in the political sphere which is permanently represented by a political party as *manifest cleavage*.

c) cleavages based on historical or socio-structural basis as *traditional* or *old cleavages*.

d) cleavages which are especially important for Eastern Europe and are based on either socio-structural issues (according to historical precedent, *traditional cleavages*), or on conflicts that emerge during the transition periods or due to activities of newly established parties *new cleavages*.

e) cleavages which cover different conflicts or “pool” them as guiding principles of politics like right vs left ideology, communism vs anti-communism, as *ideological cleavages*.

When referring to cleavages, we can actually think of different constellations. A broad and differentiated definition of cleavages allows for the inclusion of dynamic elements (Sartori, 1968) and the establishment of new cleavages (Inglehart 1977; Torcal, Mainwaring, 2002, 2003). Not only does such a definition serve to incorporate permanent and stable relations between citizens and parties into the concept of Lipset and Rokkan. Furthermore, it also reflects the realities of Eastern European societies – some of which are still in the process of transition and might experience the emergence of cleavages unexpected in the original concept (for instance see Kitschelt, 1999 on the communism–anti-communism cleavage). Together with the hypotheses mentioned above, the modernized cleavage concept should be able to answer the fundamental research question :

Are there, after 1989, any (classical) cleavages in Eastern Europe that are suitable to explain a substantial part of the voting behavior of Eastern European constituencies ?

Micro-Level: Voting Behavior and Cleavages

It is obvious that an answer to the questions formulated above requires analysis at both the micro-level and the macro-level. For one, the concept of cleavages refers to structural relations between societal groups and parties, which can differ between Eastern and Western Europe. Secondly, relations between society and party system are based on personal behavior. Only afterwards can the cleavage concept be used as an explanatory approach to party systems on the structural level.

The *Macro-Micro-Model of Voting Behavior* is based on the assumption that correlations between two elements of the political system or society cannot be explained solely on the aggregate level. Rather, members of society or the political system achieve those effects by their combined action on the individual level. Therefore, any explanatory model has to identify positions and attitudes relating to the macro-structures on the micro-level, explain causal interrelations in this sphere and finally identify their repercussions on the aggregate level where structural relations between objects become visible again.

Thus, the approach of the article offers an investigation of cleavages as a dependent variable that is related to the level of modernization within a society under the assumption that their existence and influence on individual voting behavior can be compared across Eastern and Western European states.

We have to analyze individual data in order to find a commitment of social groups to parties and to find out whether the members of those social groups are voting for their parties. Voting behavior will be measured by vote shares reported in the “Sunday question” at various national election studies and the CSES-data (1996, www.cses.org) as well as the Public Opinion Barometer (1999, 2002, 2005) established and published by the Open Society Foundation at Romania (www.osf.ro/en/publicatii.php?id_cat=2)².




Figure 1. *Macro-Micro-Model of Party Competition* (Bürklin, Klein, 1996, p. 75, Gabriel, 1997, p. 251)

Macro-Level : Structural Background

The general thesis of modernization is rooted in a logical sequence of economic, social, cognitive-ideological and political-organizational modernization which leads to democratization. Social changes refer to the break down of old social structures and milieus, social mobilization and new political topics ; cognitive-ideological changes describe the expansion of education : citizens are able to understand even complex topics without explanation by a party ; and political-organizational changes build up new cleavages which are covered by new parties and the expansion of participation.

Inglehart, Welzel (2005, 19-23) claim that socioeconomic development is crucial to a society’s further development because it “impacts powerfully on the people’s existential conditions and their chances of survival” (2005, 23). Socioeconomic advance also influences a society’s development towards a roughly predictable direction (2005, 19). This also leads to a change of some core values, as one school of scientists predicts : Values converge as a result of modernization. Traditional values decline and are replaced by modern ones. Others claim a persistence of traditional values and their independence of economic conditions.

Although there might be some robust islands of persistent values in Asian, Islamic or Orthodox cultures, socioeconomic changes also produce systematic changes in the people’s beliefs, wishes, and demands, while the influence of traditional values does not entirely disappear. Therefore it depends on where the society starts from when it is exposed to modernization – cultural change is path-dependent (2005, 20). It depends on the historical and cultural constellation of the society and the sequencing of political liberalization : The constellation of classes, types of political coalitions and the historical development of the country shapes the modernization processes.

The first and general theory of modernization provides four indicators for measuring the sequences of modernization : GDP (GDP ppp), education (secondary and tertiary education), health (infant mortality) and tertiarization (proportion of the tertiary sector)³. A cluster analysis is run on the basis of these four indicators starting in 1950 and results in four phases of modernization between 1950 and 2000. Within each cluster there is an increase of all four indicators, i.e. all socioeconomic factors are “modernizing”.

An interpretation of the phases of modernization that the cluster analyses produced has to keep in mind, that the countries included in the comparison show at least four different starting-points of modernization

(second theory of modernization – path-dependency): roughly spoken, the Germans were re-educated to democracy after World War II, after a complete destruction of their political system. Slovenia belonged to the “block free” countries and had the most powerful economy in the Balkans. It liberated itself from the hegemony of Serbian leadership and became the most successful new EU member state. Hungary had a long and deep rooted tradition of economic and scientific exchange with its Western neighbors. Until 2005 it belonged to the leading Eastern European countries. Bulgaria and Romania were ruled by paternalistic dictators who created closed societies within closed borders. The Bulgarian society was thankful towards the Russians because they liberated them from the Turkish “yoke”; the Romanian dictator Ceaușescu had subjugated his people under a strict policy of austerity to get rid of any foreign influence. Both countries were said to lag behind in the European modernization, a fact that changed when the countries developed their own methods and velocity of integration. Both made it to the EU in 2007 and are now on their way to follow-up modernization, if one likes this expression.

Although there are many differences between the countries’ (path-depending) modernization processes, they all share the belief that any further development in the four socioeconomic fields of society (economy, education, health and services) adds to their social and economic welfare and development.

Method

Selection of cases

In principle, the investigation is based on countries that belong to the *European cultural area* which is not only defined on a historical and cultural basis, but also by the technical criterion of membership in the Council of Europe. This cultural option is a possibility to outline Europe as a whole,

though admittedly linked with a political condition, since only democratic states are admitted into the Council. This criterion was amended by the definition of democratic systems by Freedom House 2000 (www.freedomhouse.org) and Polity IV 2000 (www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity), thus excluding countries that were rated “partly free” or scored less than 7 points on the democracy scale of Polity IV (consistent democracy).

On this basis, the hypothesis of a late modernization is examined:

Using cluster analysis, four phases of modernization are determined based on the modernization indicators GNP per capita, share of students with secondary and tertiary education, share of employees in the service sector as well as child mortality rates (App. 1).

The phases start with the first valid observation of the study in 1950. For most Western European countries, phase 1 ends in the mid- and end-fifties. Phase 2 lasts until the end of the 1960s, phase 3 until the mid-/end-1980s. In Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Romania are still in phase 1, while only Estonia and Slovenia made it to phase 3 by the year 2000. Those Eastern and Western European countries which come closest to the cluster centre for the respective phase of modernization possess the most typical attributes for such a phase and are chosen for the cross-sectional study. On the basis of national election studies, the comparison will investigate the relation of cleavages, social structure, ideological values and voting behavior in each modernization phase.

The choice of cases led to the following research design:

- Among Eastern European countries, *Bulgaria* and *Romania* were chosen for the analysis and placed in the first phase of modernization. *Hungary* is an example for a country with heterogeneous indicators of modernization in the second phase, while *Slovenia* has been in the third phase for the longest time of all Eastern European countries. Therefore, Slovenian election behavior could come closest to the voting behavior of Western European populations. Furthermore, this country “skipped” the first phase of modernization

and already had close contact with Western countries during the time of socialism, thus allowing for a fast and (relatively) painless economic transition.

- Among the Western countries, Germany was chosen as a transformation country of the second wave with a high degree of modernization.

- For each country national election studies were chosen based upon the closest proximity of the values of the modernization cluster of each country to the centre of the cluster: within the countries and modernization phases those national election surveys were selected which took place when the country was closest to the cluster centre. These are the following studies⁴: 1953 for Germany during the phase 1, 1961 for phase 2, 1976 for phase 3 and 2002 for phase 4. For Romania 1996, Bulgaria 1999, Hungary 1993 and 1999 for phase 1 and 2, and for Slovenia 1992 and 1998 for phase 2 and 3 (App. 2). The case of Romania serves as an additional test to investigate changes and developments within a respective phase of modernization.

Measurement

Many comparisons of Western and Eastern European party systems and the voting behavior that led to the formation of such systems lends itself to an analysis of party families rather than single parties (Bartolini, Mair, 1990; Rose, Munro, 2003; Schmitt, 2001, 639; Jahn, 1999, 569; Budge, 2001; Ismayr, 1999, 2004; Ziemer, 2003; Lane, Jan-Erik, McKay, David, Newton, Kenneth, 1997, 138-148). In my case, I used the "pure" parties instead, organizing them in a way that the party in the far left column of the tables is also located at the left side of the ideological spectrum, and parties at the right side of the tables are located at the right side of the spectrum⁵ (according to Laver, Benoit, 2006). Additionally, I have to introduce some further restrictions:

- 1) Parties are only considered if they either held seats in a national parliament during at least one legislative term since 1990 or if

they merged with other parties fulfilling this condition, thus meeting three out of the four conditions for a successful, encompassing and durable transmission of a societal group's desires, requirements and interests into "real" politics (Lipset, Rokkan, 1967, 27-39).

- 2) A precondition for the persistence of representation of conflicts and the formation of a cleavage is the representation of a party in the national parliament.

- 3) Should parties receive too little electoral support to enter the national parliament, we assume that the respective cleavage is superposed by a different conflict, taken over by a different party, or that the conflict lost its relevance.

All three assumptions shall be verified by a statistical analysis of survey data (logistic regression) which require at least 20 cases for a sound analysis. Therefore, I excluded all parties with less than 20 "votes" at the Sunday question.

Indicators

When does a person fit in a cleavage structure? Properties of social structure are often equated with cleavages. Already in 1968, Sartori has been able to show that social structure and an objective class membership only represent the first level of class membership and deep entrenchment of voters in their social and political milieu. Following Sartori (1968), Weßels suggests a separation of social structure and group linkage. If supplemented by group ideology, such a model could predict voting behavior in dependence of group affiliation (Weßels, 2000, 133). Furthermore, his suggestion for an operationalization includes core groups (socio-structural affiliation and group formation) as well as ideologically-oriented core groups that display additional differences on a self-assessed right-left-scale.

Based on this model of operationalization, Weßels concludes that group linkage, i.e. the shaping of the group consciousness by the core groups, does not lose its influence on voting behavior (individualization, sectoral dealignment) while the politicization of all

groups decreased significantly (de-ideologization, secularization). The crucial factor for the loss of influence of social structure and group-based elements, however, is the “dramatic reduction of membership groups and core groups which both display a relatively constant group influence on voting behavior” (Weßels, 2000, p. 153 ; ecological dealignment)⁶.

Social structure refers to the basic personal characteristics of an individual – his or her sex, age, education and income. Income also has an impact on the person’s adaptation to class values⁷ and to his or her financial resources which again may influence his or her hierarchy of needs. All indicators of social structure belong to the features of objective group membership. The classical cleavages are measured by various indicators, some indicate an objective group membership (ethnic affiliation, residence and occupation), and some point to group consciousness (minority language, religious identity, church attendance and union membership) or to an affiliation to a politicized group (left-right-self-placement). They are apt to indicate an individual’s place within the society and his or her affiliation to a party which may result in a certain voting behavior.

East European Cleavages and Romanian voting Behavior in Comparative Perspective

Social Structure

Referring to Sartori (1968) und Weßels (2000), however, the influence of objective class membership on the voting behavior should be less important than the link through cleavages. This assumption cannot be confirmed for Eastern European countries : membership of a certain age group or profession (the professional and economic status [objective class membership]) has a significant influence on the linkage of the respective voters to their parties.

An overview of all four Eastern European countries, Germany and all modernization phases shows that :

1) there is no common development of voting behavior regarding the impact of social-structural personal characteristics.

2) the tendency of this impact is similar in all countries : the characteristics of those voting for social democrat or socialist parties differ notably from those voting for liberal, conservative/Christian or peasant parties.

Table 1. *Indicators of Objective and Subjective Strata*

	<i>core group</i>		<i>politicized group</i>
	objective group membership : social structure and class	group consciousness : cleavage	ideology
<i>worker-capital</i>	profession, status of profession (<i>class</i>) according to Erikson, Goldthorpe (1992)	union membership (class consciousness)	left-right-self placement
<i>church-state</i>	church membership	church attendance	
<i>center- periphery</i>	ethnic affiliation, regional affiliation, affiliation to a religious minority	minority language, religious identity, attachment to a religious minority	
<i>land-industry</i>	residence	(residence)	
controlling variables			
<i>social structure</i>	age, sex, education, income		

social structure/age, sex, education, income

Source : author’s selection ; parts of the cleavages according to Berglund, Hellén, Aarebrot, 1998, 10 ; Weßels, 2000, 136.

Table 2. *Social Structural Impact on Voting Behavior*

	Phase of Modernization 1	Phase of Modernization 2	Phase of Modernization 3	Phase of Modernization 4
Germany	BP vs. BG/BHE, SPD vs. FDP			Greens
Hungary	SZDSZ, FIDESZ vs. KDNP, MDF, FKgP	FKgP	--	--
Romania	PDSR vs. PSDR, USD	--	--	--
Bulgaria	BSP vs. ODS vs. DPS	--	--	--
Slovenia	--	ZLSD vs. SNS vs. SLS	SNS, SMS vs. DESUS	--

Relevance for parties producing Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$; -- = not relevant, empty cells = Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$ or coefficient exp(b) not significant

3) The impact of social-structural personal characteristics has decreased in Hungary and Germany. There is still some influence on the voting behavior of the German Green voters and the Hungarian Small Farmers Party's voters (FKgP).

There are some indications of social milieus breaking open, of social strata becoming more permeable and of an individualization of the voting decision within this development. In Hungary, social-structural personal characteristics are covered by other cleavages which is to be shown by further analyses later on. In Slovenia, social-structural personal characteristics are important when parties address such features, especially age, and turn them into the main topic of their program.

Broader analyses of the Romanian data-set start in 1996, the most typical year within the first phase of modernization of the Romanian society. But as the course of modernization does not pursue a staircase model, there are also changes of behavior within the respective phase of modernization. In order to show at least some of them, I will present a comparison of four different points in time starting in 1996 and ending in 2005⁸.

All indicators of a voter's personal social-structural characteristics cause differences in voting behavior : in 1999, men preferred ApR ; later PRM showed a typical profile of rightist parties known from Western

Europe : Its voters are young and male. Well educated citizens vote for conservative parties (CDR, PD), partly because their party programs promise equal opportunities within a market economy instead of ideological dogma. Younger voters prefer center-right parties, older voters prefer parties of the left like PDSR. They may be traditionally voting for parties of the left. Their party affiliation stems from their biography as well as their need for consistency in their vita and value system. The younger ones favor more pragmatic parties from the right spectrum or ideologically balanced parties. They will likely abstain from the polls, if such a party is not in the competition. At the time of Ceausescu's fall from power and his subsequent execution they were still too young to take responsibility for this era. Ceausescu's communism is not a part of their biography that they have to answer for.

The young electorate is individualized and foremost relies on its own capacity instead of turning to the state. They are also more frustrated than the older population (for more about the attitudes and values of different age groups, see Mărginean 2004a, 126-130)⁹.

There wasn't much change in the social-structural characteristics of the Romanian voters : The party affiliation of the populace with low formal education and

little income remained quite strong until 2005 ; the preferences of the rest of the population are neither clear cut nor stable, which is partly due to the floating party system. Parties that were able to stabilize within the party competition – PD, PRM, PNL, PDSR/PSD, and UDMR – were also mostly able to connect themselves to voters with a stabilizing social-structural profile. The voters of UDMR

define themselves along ethnic-cultural lines, not along social-structural patterns as will be shown in the next chapter. There is also a distinctive feature about the PDSR that will be explained by the analysis of the land-industry-cleavage : The PDSR aimed especially at the rural population whose social-structural personal characteristics are already apparent here.

Table 3. Romania Phase 1 – Social Structure

Romania 1996	PDSR	USD*	PSDR*	PD*	CDR**	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.128	0.064	0.058		0.022		
sex							
age (year of birth)	0.980	1,040					
education	0.799				1,107		
income	0.832		1,607				

* voting coalition USD, ** voting coalition of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 1999	PDSR	ApR	PD	CDR*	PNTCD*	PNL*	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.050	0.086		0.017	0.011			0.013
Sex		0.661						
age (year of birth)		1,014			0.982			1,015
education	0.761	1,490		1,208				

*voting coalition CDR of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 2002	PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.027	0.133	0.045	0.019	0.022	0.026
sex				0.646		
age (year of birth)		0.977		1,010		0.982
education	0.077	1,576	1,224		1,170	

Romania 2005	PSD	PD	DA*	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.051	0.038		0.010	0.024	
sex				0.638		
age (year of birth)						
education	0.887	1,101			1,124	

* voting coalition ; source : CSES 1996, Public Opinion 1999, 2002, 2005 ; logistic regression, coefficient exp(b), sig. < 0.05 ; empty cells = not significant, sex : < 1 = male, > 1 = female ; parties with more than 20 respondents in the survey ; author's calculations

Center-Periphery

A further important aspect of voting behavior in Eastern Europe is the ethnical composition of populations. More often than in Western Europe we can find a numerically dominating titular nation with one or several minorities often belonging to the majority population of a neighboring country¹⁰. This fact can at

times lead to an intensification of conflicts within ethnically mixed states, which Lipset and Rokkan would describe as a centre-periphery-cleavage.

There are national minorities in Romania that notably differ from the titular nation according to language, religious denomination or culture – the Hungarians, Germans and Roma. In some cases, indirect models of

Table 4. Romania Phase 1 – Center-Periphery

Romania 1996	PDSR	USD*	PSDR*	PD*	CDR**	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>					0.028		0.780
language : Hungarian					0.192		50,369
ethnic group : Romanian							0.026

* voting coalition USD, ** voting coalition of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 1999	PDSR	ApR	PD	CDR*	PNTCD*	PNL*	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.064	0.034						0.717
ethnic group : Romanian	9,809	14,284						
Hungarian								1784,385
Roma								

* voting coalition CDR of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 2002	PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.054		0.010	0.016		0.745
ethnic group : Romanian	6,463		2,819	3,399		
Hungarian						1181,793
Roma	4,513					

Romania 2005	PSD	PD	DA*	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.047	0.022		0.029		0.659
ethnic group : Romanian	10,232	9,125				
Hungarian				9,621		363,065
Roma	18,571					

* voting coalition ; source : CSES 1996, Public Opinion 1999, 2002, 2005 ; logistic regression, coefficient exp(b), sig.<0.05 ; empty cells=not significant ; parties with more than 20 respondents in the survey ; author’s calculations

measurement can shed light on the voting behavior of ethnic minorities. German and Hungarian minorities in Romania, for example, do not only use the language of their origin but also belong to religious denominations different from the Romanian majority population. With all due precaution, we can therefore assign ethnic origin by the religious faith of the respondents. A similar process can be used for Bulgaria where the Turkish minority predominantly adheres to the Islam. An explicit link between these minorities and the parties which represent "their" interests (and theirs only) can be verified by the significant explanatory power of the religious denominations for the choice of an ethnical party. The Hungarian minority has established a party – UDMR – that takes part in national elections to represent the respective interests of the Hungarians in Romania. Ethnic origin, Catholic or Protestant denomination, and the Hungarian mother tongue define the affiliation with the Hungarian minority that demands political representation.

The Roma population has not founded a national party yet, even though they, of course, also have particular interests and a need for representation.

The ethnic Hungarians in Romania vote for what they consider to be "their" party, the UDMR. They won't cast their ballot for any major Romanian party, regardless of its position in the political spectrum. Romanians, then again, won't vote for the Hungarian Party – the ethnic divide in voting behavior is obvious.

Ethnic conflicts, oppression of minorities or even their negation did not emerge as a central theme in official public policy. Until 1989, Ceaușescu had outlawed the use of the German or Hungarian languages. Members of the respective minority were assimilated into the Romanian ethnic group by force. During and after the transformation, the ethnic conflicts surfaced. During the transformation in 1989/1990 they culminated in several violent conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians¹¹; the need for individual political protection and protection of the national

minority groups became obvious. The party of the Hungarian minority UDMR has been representing the Hungarian ethnic group since 1989. It has been especially successful at the Hungarian settlements in Transylvania and Banat and also serves as an assurance of the minorities' identity.

To some extent, one could assume that the UDMR also added to the success of some Romanian nationalist parties – PUNR and PRM – in those areas (de Nève, 2003, 205). The ethnic Romanians vote for "their" parties (PDSR/PSD, PRM) as well, because they feel dominated by the Hungarians.

Analogous to the political and social situation of the Hungarian minority at the beginning of the 1990s, the ethnic cleavage between Hungarians and Romanians was of great importance. It became part of the regular democratic party competition when the UDMR stabilized its position within the party system and became a stable and reliable political partner. Since 1996, the UDMR has been part of the ruling coalitions or has been supporting minority governments. Although it did not act in favor of their patronage only, it also tried to represent and advance the Hungarians interests. The centre-periphery-cleavage became more important now rather as a social conflict between unequally developed communities than as an ethnic conflict between ethnic groups¹².

Church-State Cleavage

The coalition of Christian or conservative parties and Christian social groups has remained stable during the course of modernization all over Europe. It was the declining membership of the Christian social groups coupled with the decreasing intensity of the "anti-church" groups to fight the churches' interests that caused the decline of this cleavage. Effects of secularization which are part of the processes of modernization facilitated the condensation. However, an empirical test comparing Eastern and Western European countries on the basis of selected variables returns only very little effects of cleavages on voting behavior for many cases.

The traditionally close link to a Christian church, i.e. a continuous commitment to their values as shown by frequent and numerous church attendances, can structure voting behavior in favor of a Christian or conservative party¹³. To some extent, the Christian and conservative parties lost their political opponent: The clientele of left parties often does not exhibit a worse than average attitude towards church.

Accordingly, voters who do not adhere to such a value structure choose parties without a clear Christian background. Especially in Western European countries, the coalition between Christian/conservative parties and Christian groups in society remains stable. The church-state cleavage in Slovenia developed similarly to the one in Germany during comparable phases of modernization. The development also shows some parallels: immediately after the fall of communism a phase of orientation and nation-building dominated. Subsequently, interest groups with a broader agenda emerged and reached beyond the issue of nation building. The state-church cleavage can be seen as a traditional cleavage. In the case of Slovenia, it outlived communism and was revived by the creation of a new Christian party.

Initially, Hungary experienced a similar process. However, the Christian party KNDP

soon lost its importance due to a continuous conflict between the members of the former KP, MSZP, and their opponents as well as the ideological reorientation of the young liberals FIDESZ towards a conservative party with a Christian appeal. Accordingly, the state-church cleavage decreased in intensity, but remained stable behind the conservative curtain. On the one hand, affiliation to church increased in Hungary, and on the other hand, the cleavage lost its structural impact on voting behavior within the second phases of modernization. One has to assume that the cleavage did not condense, but that it has overlapped with another dominating cleavage within the social conflict.

Overall, we can assume that the continuity hypothesis can be affirmed for Slovenia and Hungary, but not for the whole of Eastern Europe.

In 2005, data on church attendance was not collected.

There is nothing equivalent to the church-state-cleavage in Romanian society. The churches are apolitical or they openly support the respective ruling parties. Pasti even goes to such length as to speak of a state-church-symbiosis (expert interview with Vladimir Pasti 29.3.2006). Possible conflicts may arise about the restitution of church property, but should take place merely on a

Table 5. *Impact of the Church-State-Cleavage on Voting Behavior*

	Phase of Modernization 1	Phase of Modernization 2	Phase of Modernization 3	Phase of Modernization 4
Germany	CDU/CSU, BP vs. SPD	CDU/CSU vs. SPD	CDU/CSU vs. SPD	CDU/CSU vs. - (PDS, SPD) ^c
Hungary	KDNP, FKgP vs. MSZP	(KDNP) ^a vs. -	--	--
Romania		--	--	--
Bulgaria		--	--	--
Slovenia	--	SKD vs. ZLSD (DS) ^b	NSi vs. -	--

Relevance for parties producing Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$; -- = not relevant, empty cells = Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$ or not significant, nd = no data; ^aIn 1989, KDNP is the only party producing a cleavage. Unfortunately, there are not enough cases in the data set for a sound analysis. Slowly but steady, KDNP has been absorbed by the FIDESZ-MPP until 1998; ^b Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.048$; ^c Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.044$

Table 6. *Romania Phase 1 – Church-State*

Romania 1996	PDSR	USD*	PSDR*	PD*	CDR**	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>		0.016					
church attendance		0.979					

* voting coalition USD, ** voting coalition of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 1999	PDSR	ApR	PD	CDR*	PNTCD*	PNL*	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>		0.012						0.012
church attendance		0.981						1,018

* voting coalition CDR of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 2002	PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>						0.017
church attendance						1,016

Source: CSES 1996, Public Opinion 1999, 2002; logistic regression, coefficient exp(b), sig. < 0.05; empty cells = not significant; parties with more than 20 respondents in the survey; author's calculations

local level. Church and state are separated, religious education is voluntary. The Orthodox Church is hardly involved in the national policy making process, and if it is involved, then it does not provoke any conflicts (expert interview with Ioan Mărginean 28.3.2006)¹⁴.

The effect of church attendance on the decision to vote for the UDMR derives from the fact that the Hungarian minority belongs either to the Catholic or the Protestant denomination and differs from the Romanian majority in the frequency of church attendance.

Land-Industry Cleavage

Considered superficially, it seems that the land-industry-cleavage has disappeared in both Eastern and Western Europe, thus being irrelevant for voting behavior. On closer inspection of specific constituencies, however, one can still find subtle differences in agrarian parties (Hungary, Slovenia) that are still able to stick to their rural-conservative clientele. The question of urban or rural resi-

dence of voters also plays a role for the choice of socialist/social democratic, liberal or green parties which mostly find their constituencies – as expected – in urban areas. One observation can be confirmed for Germany as well as other West European countries: The difference between urban and rural populations seems to have vanished. However, the conflict seems to have regained importance with the migration of highly-educated liberal and green-alternative voters into the cities and the continuous subjective assignment of the (religious) rural population to the Christian parties. Additionally, however, we also have to take into consideration that this development obviously reflects some deeper underlying differences, which again relate to the fact that supporters of liberal and ecological parties live in (midsized) cities, while the rural population is still dominantly more religious and conservative.

Taking the original concept as a criterion for the existence of the land-industry-cleavage, one can only find it in countries where peasant parties have survived the modernization process – in Slovenia, and to a much lesser

extent, in Hungary. While the trends in Europe are quite similar – the impact of the land-industry-cleavage is decreasing – the Slovene Peasant Party has been able to stay in touch with its clientele. The structural function of the cleavage is still working because the peasant party is still the representative of the peasants. In the case of the remaining countries, other cleavages which are interwoven with the land-industry-cleavage provoke effects within this cleavage, which do not mirror the original difference between rural population and its products and the urban population and its working conditions and markets any longer. The attributes of the rural and the urban population overlap with other conflicting attributes like occupation, education and religiosity.

The cleavage disappeared during the second phase of modernization in Hungary when the FKgP split over the party's performance in government: there is no party left which offers to represent the peasants exclusively. Today, peasants vote for the "catch-all-conservatives-party", FIDESZ, which absorbed the FKgP.

The Bulgarian and Romanian parties that are favored by the rural population are no real peasant parties, but social democratic or socialist (PDSR und BSP) or minority parties (DPS). They address the rural population because of pragmatic reasons and may be able to have an impact on the voting behavior because most their voters live on the

countryside, like the Turkish minority in Bulgaria that votes for DPS¹⁶. The reasons for voting social democrat or socialist or for a minority party are obviously interfering with each other.

In Romania and Bulgaria, we can still find a relatively explicit difference between urban and rural population. While the rural population still harbors many supporters of the socialists, urban groups feel that they are represented by conservative parties. This could be related to the fact that neither Romania nor Bulgaria has got a true liberal party. Therefore, market and business interests are represented by conservatives, which also absorb the liberal urban clientele. The existence of a cleavage could only be confirmed on the basis of a time series analysis, which could substantiate the continuity of these linkages.

The PDSR/PSD may be called a party of the rural population. Some of their voters may also live in cities, but there is a positive and strong correlation between rural residence and the intention to vote for that party. If one takes the election results of the peasants into account, the close links between the rural population and the PDSR become even more obvious. Further analysis corroborates this result (de Nève, 2003, 204).

Experts, however, impetuously deny (expert interview with Vladimir Pasti 29.3.2006) that the PDSR attends to the interests of the rural population in the sense of performing a

Table 7. *Impact of the Land-Industry-Cleavage on Voting Behavior*

	Phase of Modernization 1	Phase of Modernization 2	Phase of Modernization 3	Phase of Modernization 4
Germany	- vs. BP			
Hungary	SZDSZ vs. -		--	--
Romania	- vs. PDSR	--	--	--
Bulgaria	- vs. BSP, DPS	--	--	--
Slovenia	--	- vs. SLS (SKD ^a)	(ZLSD ^b vs. SKD+SLS ^c)	--

Relevance for parties producing Nagelkerke $R^2 > 0.05$; --=not relevant, empty cells = Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$ or not significant; ^a Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.047$, ^b $R^2 = 0.042$, ^c $R^2 = 0.039$

true representative function that would be required for the definition as a cleavage.

The peasants benefited from some PDSR-government aid for households with low income and therefore voted social democratic. Little by little, the PDSR adopted the interests of their constituents to assure their votes. This development only makes sense if one takes additionally into account that the rural population was critical of the economic, social and political reforms and trusted Iliescu as a politician. Sandu (2004a, 2004b) claims that differences in voting behavior between the rural and urban population were caused by different attitudes towards the political and economic restructuring (for details of land restoration see Socol in Mărginean, 2004a, 134-135) and trust in the political institutions that were headed by the PDSR until 1996. Additionally, the PDSR is supported by local landowners and businessmen. At times, the party held 80% of the mayoralities and had the image of a localized

party of a team of powerful politicians with great mobilization potential. However, according to some experts (expert interview with Vladimir Pasti and Cristian Pîrvulescu 29.3.2006) the PDSR actually does not represent explicitly the interests of the rural population.

The land-industry-cleavage within the Romanian society also expresses a contrast between the underdeveloped rural population and the urban population that votes for the conservative PD and has got a higher education, higher incomes and a developed infrastructure (Mărginean, 2004, 131). Sandu called this a "culture complex" characterized by "higher education, higher income and urban residence" vs. "lower education, lower income and rural residence" (expert interview 30.3.2006; details also at Mărginean 2004a: 130-133). The cleavage has not expanded into the national political debate so far. In defiance of the expert's skepticism, the rural population voted for

Table 8. Romania Phase 1 – Land-Industry

Romania 1996	PDSR	USD*	PSDR*	PD*	CDR**	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.089				0.020		
residence	0.614				1,217		

* voting coalition USD, ** voting coalition of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 1999	PDSR	ApR	PD	CDR*	PNTCD*	PNL*	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.010	0.036			0.12			0.027
residence	0.692	2,628			0.547			0.413

* voting coalition CDR of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 2002	PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.49	0.041	0.033			
residence	0.828	1,350	1,228			

Romania 2005	PSD	PD	DA*	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.044	0.021	0.008			0.017
residence	0.813	1,187	1,088			0.827

* voting coalition; source: CSES 1996, Public Opinion 1999, 2002, 2005; logistic regression, coefficient exp(b), sig. < 0.05; empty cells = not significant; parties with more than 20 respondents in the survey; author's calculations

the social democratic PDSR during the first phase of modernization and differs in this aspect from the urban population, a fact which militates in favor of the existence of a land-industry-cleavage.

In the near future, the cleavage may become even more important if temporary migrant laborers from mid-sized cities will import prosperity and modern values from their host countries (mainly Italy, Spain and Portugal). The conflict has been nascent since 2000 and presents itself as a purely social cleavage or as a latent cleavage between the more developed and the underdeveloped communities that have to rely on subsistence farming (expert interview with Dumitru Sandu 30.3.2006). Socol (in Mărginean, 2004a, 135-136; 2004b) reports that there hasn't been much change in the quality of life of the peasant population since the early transition. Sharp drops in prizes for agricultural products, poverty and the lack of social organizations or unions often add up to poor living conditions (54% of the poor live in rural areas [Socol in Mărginean, 2004a, 136-137]).

Class voting – Labor-Capital Cleavage

In today's Western countries, the difference between labor and capital hasn't got the binding strength between a societal group and

"their" party as diagnosed by Lipset, Rokkan in 1967 anymore. In Germany, the conflict has been largely conserved and its role is still important, even though it slightly declined until 2002. In Germany, the relevance of this cleavage also has decreased clearly but the structure of the constituency remained the same on a lower quantitative level (structural dealignment). The functional connection of unions and social democrats has been weakened by the move of the SPD towards the political center.

For Eastern Europe, however, we can possibly confirm the aforementioned discontinuity hypotheses: a "special relationship" between labor and social democrats cannot be detected.

So far, the Eastern European voters have not arranged themselves along the cleavage line. While there are many parties that are primarily supported by workers, as in Romania and Bulgaria, they lack an adversary representing the "capital". Furthermore, as often in Eastern Europe, the status of a worker remains uncertain and many employees regard themselves as workers, even though they don't conform to the traditional objective categories (e.g. Erikson, Goldthorpe, 1992).

On the one hand, the self-conception as a worker reflects a dissociation from the intelligentsia, and the concept of "worker" stands for more than the occupations that are typical

Table 9. *Impact of the Labor-Capital-Cleavage on Voting Behavior*

	Phase of Modernization 1	Phase of Modernization 2	Phase of Modernization 3	Phase of Modernization 4
Germany	SPD vs. FDP, CDU/CSU, [BP]	SPD vs. FDP, CDU/CSU	SPD vs. CDU/CSU	PDS, (SPD) ^b vs. (CDU/CSU) ^b
Hungary	FKgP vs. FIDESZ	MSZMP vs. -	--	--
Romania	PDSR vs. UDMR	--	--	--
Bulgaria	BSP vs. -	--	--	--
Slovenia	--	SKD, [SLS] vs. -	[SLS+SKD] ^a vs. -	--

Relevance for parties producing Nagelkerke $R^2 > 0.05$; -- = not relevant, empty cells = Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$ or not significant, [xxx] = peasant parties, regional parties; ^a Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.046$; ^b Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.049$.

Table 10. Romania Phase 1 – Class Voting

Romania 1996	PDSR	USD*	PSDR*	PD*	CDR**	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.096	0.034					0.066
peasant	3,821	0.197					0.074
worker							
skilled worker							
white collar worker							
service sector							
union member	0.544						

* voting coalition USD, ** voting coalition of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 1999	PDSR	ApR	PD	CDR*	PNTCD*	PNL*	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.032	0.084	0.017			0.033		0.034
peasant								2,057
worker		0.206				4,181		4,140
skilled worker								1,983
white collar worker	0.475	2,380	1,656					
service sector								
union member			0.525					

* voting coalition CDR of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 2002	PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>		0.084				
peasant		0.109				
worker						
skilled worker						
white collar worker						
service sector						

Romania 2005	PSD	PD	DA*	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.053	0.065	0.022			
peasant						
worker						
skilled worker		0.442				
white collar worker	2,351	0.402				
service sector	4,267	0.092				
union member			1,661			

* voting coalition ; source : CSES 1996, Public Opinion 1999, 2002, 2005 ; logistic regression, coefficient exp(b), sig. < 0.05 ; empty cells = not significant ; parties with more than 20 respondents in the survey ; author's calculations

for the Western European working classes. On the other hand, the post-communist parties did not automatically act as successor parties of the CPs in “representing the workers’ interests”. The party platforms varied from socialist/social democratic (PDSR, BSP, ZLSD) to social-liberal (MSZP) or liberal topics (LDS). Additionally, communist-anti-communist-cleavages cut across the labor-capital-cleavage (Slovenia) or the labor-capital-cleavage is superposed by another social and political conflict (Hungary).

In Hungary, both the phase of party formation and that of concentration was marked by an antagonism between labor and capital reflected in the party system. This difference also helps to retrace the ideological re-orientation of the formally liberal FIDESZ : In 1993, it was the party of choice for anti-communist unions, while in 1999, it had already transformed into a party of the “capital”. The crucial element for this classification, however, is likely to be based on the party’s strict opposition to the communist successor party, MSZP, as well as on the cultural struggle (*Kulturkampf*) within Hungarian politics that emerged from the democratization process.

Therefore, we can assume that the labor vs. capital cleavage is superposed by an antagonism of right-wing vs. left-wing politics, which found its expression in the ideological placement of the henceforth conservative and middle-class based FIDESZ in 1999.

It seems that the developments in Eastern Europe – possibly with the exception of Hungary – would confirm the above mentioned hypothesis of discontinuity : a special relationship between workers and social democracy cannot be seen as pointing to a deficient structuring of society, broken cleavages and a below-average re-structuring in the sense of cleavage theory.

As we assumed from the analysis of the land-industry-cleavage, the peasants voted for the social democratic PDSR (de Nève, 2003, 204). The peasant’s voting behavior represents their original affiliation to the

PDSR to a lesser extent than the fact that the social democrats subsidized the rural households with low incomes. Especially occupational groups with small salaries and civil servants feel attracted by that party which in turn incorporated some of their interests and demands in its program. The PDSR/PSD stood for continuity and stability ; one did not expect major changes under its administration, partly because they wrapped them optimistically in easy solutions (for changes of the Romanian welfare state see Vonica Radutiu, 2005). Hence, the PSDR/PSD apparently offered the security of the past and a charismatic political leader (Ion Iliescu) who was entrusted with the administration of the country (Sandu, 2004a, 4). One could be tempted to call that a classical cleavage according to the interaction model, weren’t it be for the rural population’s propensity to vote for another party at the very moment that distribution of goods in their favor failed to show, or for the CDR breaking to pieces, and the PSDR/PSD changing permanently for the last years, and were there any intermediary group like a framers’ union that could cooperate with the PSDR/PSD¹⁶. Since non of these is the case, one has to assume that until 1996 a cleavage has been foreshadowing that did not manifest itself because the CDR broke apart and the affiliated social groups were not able to organize themselves. At present, the worker-capital-cleavage remains a latent cleavage on an un-organized social level and could possibly emerge after the integration of Romania into the EU (expert interview with Vladimir Pasti 29.3.2006), because the integration has been supported by all social strata and has dominated the political agenda until 2006.

Ideology

The division into right-wing and left-wing political camps offers the best indications for the electoral choice of either communist or socialist-social democratic parties on the one hand and Christian, conservative and national parties on the other. The explanatory

potential is far more powerful than that of social structure or “traditional” cleavages and, therefore, becomes the decisive explanatory factor. Apart from the religious denomination, the right-left-dimension is often the only factor that exerts a truly strong and thus relevant influence on the voting behavior in Eastern European countries.

Apart from the Romanian case, the ideological fault line divides parties and their voters into an expected right wing – Christian and conservative parties, national parties and agrarian parties – and a left wing – social democrats or socialists, and communists, and, in Slovenia, also liberals. It seems that there is neither a genesis of cleavages aligning the traditional conflicts nor an ideological split of the party systems in Romania.

The Romanian voters vary from apathy and alienation to cynism towards their political parties. Since 2005, the government has been trying to shed some light on the misconduct of former and current leading politicians and to restore the citizens’ confidence in the parties through an increased prosecution of corruption. But as the Romanian voters seem to lump all politicians together there is no sense in differentiating between the ideological imprint of parties and to integrate oneself into a political camp. The only social structure that had an impact on the voting behavior in 1996 during the first phase of modernization is the ethnic cleavage.

The ideological cleavage that determines the voting behavior in all other Eastern European countries. It offers a sound explanation of the voting behavior and is obviously an effective instrument for the voters to reduce complexity of information by forming political camps. Those camps seem to interfere with the communism-anti-communism-cleavage.

Some parties in Bulgaria and Slovenia cannot be assigned to any ideological camp: partly, because they don’t have a clear ideological profile and mix elements of social democracy, liberalism and nationalism or conservatism (especially in Bulgaria, this is also true for the SNS in Slovenia), and partly because they built their party platform on one political issue only – like the SMS and DESUS in Slovenia or finally because the parties are designed according to ethnic cleavages (Bulgaria).

The voters in Western Europe structure themselves along the left-right-continuum due to various reasons: the German population follows a tradition dating back to the dawn of German democracy and acts on political issues which represent the policy of the respective political camp. The other cleavages which have an impact on the Germans’ voting behavior – the labor-capital- and the church-state-cleavage – probably intensify the ideological cleavage¹⁷.

Compared to all other countries in the analysis, there is only a weak ideological

Table 11. *The Impact of the Ideological Cleavage on Voting Behavior*

	Phase of Modernization 1	Phase of Modernization 2	Phase of Modernization 3	Phase of Modernization 4
Germany	nd	nd	SPD vs. CDU/CSU	PDS, SPD vs. CDU/CSU
Hungary	MSZP vs. KDNP, MDF, FKgP	MSZP vs. FIDESZ-MPP, FKgP	--	--
Romania	[PDAR]* vs. -	--	--	--
Bulgaria	BSP vs. ODS	--	--	--
Slovenia	--	ZLSD, LDS vs. SKD, SNS	ZLSD, LDS vs. NSi, SDS	--

Relevance for parties producing Nagelkerke $R^2 > 0.05$; --=not relevant, empty cells = Nagelkerke $R^2 < 0.05$ or not significant, [xxx]=peasant parties, regional parties; * only party with left-right-imprint, too little cases for sound analysis; nd = no data.

cleavage in Romania. The reasons for this are manifold :

As further analyses show (expert interview with Cristian Pîrvulescu 29.3.2006), only few of the Romanians understand the left-right-scale of political competition in the sense of the Western concept, i.e. many do not conceptualize it in a way that comes close to Western notions of “left” and “right” parties. Analysis estimates the proportion of Romanians using the LRS in the sense of a Western concept at about 54% (CSES Modul 2 2001-2005) or 51% (CSES Module 1 1996-2001) and those using the concept consistently at 39% (CSES Module 2) or 34% (CSES Module 1 ; Badeşcu/Sum, 2005, 5, 7). Thus, an ideological self-conception and an ideological classification of parties are difficult.

There isn't any ideological debate in Romania ; the voters don't have clear concepts of social democratic, liberal or conservative policies. In many cases, the Romanians don't vote for a certain social policy, but more stereotypical for a change (1996) or against corruption (2004). Perception of corruption, the DA's success in challenging the PSD for neglecting the problem too long and presenting itself as more efficient in this respect evoked a more frequent and consistent use of the left-right-scale (Badeşcu, Sum, 2005, 14). One will search in vain for an ideological component, like voting a social democratic government out of office (expert interview with Mălina Voicu 28.3.2006 and Cristian Pîrvulescu 29.3.2006). The policy of redistribution run by the PDSR/PSD-governments has to be considered as an attempt to please the party's clientele, especially the rural population, instead of an implementation of a classical social democratic program of structural redistribution of taxes in favor of the lower social strata. This favoritism works as long as the patron is well-off : early in 2006, surveys showed that the voting potential of the PSD (Sunday question) dropped from 37% to 23% (expert interview with Cristian Pîrvulescu 29.3.2006 and Günter W. Dill 31.3.2006)¹⁸.

Despite all experts' skepticism, the Public Opinion-data set unveils an ideological cleav-

age that obviously has gained some strength in 2005. Compared to 1996, the left-right-scale became a more important factor of identifying parties and their ideological concept or their ideological past (PSD). The reasons may be multifaceted :

1)The party platforms became more settled, and the parties modernized their programs awaiting the country's accession to EU.

2)The party system stabilized, and mergers and dissolutions decreased in number.

3)In 1999 and 2002, the Public Opinion-data set did not include an item regarding the self-placement on the left-right-scale of party competition. Therefore, the ideological cleavage had to be analyzed on the basis of two substituting indicators – the choice between a policy in favor of stable prices (“combat inflationary pressure”) and reduction of unemployment. The only thing that became obvious from the substituting indicators was the fact that the PDSR-voters claimed some aspects of liberal or conservative policies (“combat inflationary pressure”), while in 1996 and 2005, the data showed an ideological left-self-placement of the voters. The followers of the PDSR/PSD might consist of technocrats with a socialist biography adapting themselves to market conditions and voters from the lower strata hoping for social welfare programs.

No Future for Classic Cleavages in Eastern Europe ?

The case of the church-state-cleavage seems to support the continuity hypothesis, the case of labor-capital the discontinuity hypothesis. In some countries, we find hints for an urban-rural division, which is partly covered up by the labor-capital cleavage.

The influence of the ideological bias of the voters on their voting behavior could be substantiated by a differentiated analysis of cleavages, social structure, and socialization. The true meaning, however, can only be discovered if we analyze these factors jointly.

Table 12. Romania Phase I – Ideology

Romania 1996	PDSR	USD*	PSDR*	PD*	CDR**	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.014				0.034		
L (-) R (+) S	0.916				1,131		

* voting coalition USD, ** voting coalition of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 1999	PDSR	ApR	PD	CDR*	PNTCD*	PNL*	PRM	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.044	0.017	0.044		0.010			
combat inflationary pressure	1,469	0.773	0.746		0.790			
reduce unemployment		1,308						

* voting coalition CDR of PNTCD, PNL, PER

Romania 2002	PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>				0.011	0.012	0.014
combat inflationary pressure (-) vs. reduce unemployment (+)				1,254	0.743	0.719

Romania 2005	PSD	PD	DA*	PRM	PNL	UDMR
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	0.219	0.028	0.054		0.070	
L (-) R (+) S	0.711	1,141	1,160		1,261	

* voting coalition ; source : CSES 1996, Public Opinion 1999, 2002, 2005 ; logistic regression, coefficient exp(b), sig. < 0.05 ; empty cells = not significant ; parties with more than 20 respondents in the survey ; author's calculations

The ideological component of the orientation in the left-right-dimension of the party systems becomes a main explanatory factor for the voting behavior in all countries – even in Romania, though later in the course of modernization. In addition, an influence of the church-state cleavage on electoral choice exists in Germany, Hungary, and Slovenia.

Therefore, we can confirm the aforementioned assumptions regarding the church-state-cleavage: its influence on voting behavior might decrease – which is mainly due to ecological as well as sectoral developments – but after 40 years of modernization and socialism it still remains an important aspect in the explanation of voting behavior across Europe.

The analyses of single countries display a higher degree of explained variance. Furthermore, this offers the opportunity to dif-

ferentiate regarding the characteristics of the respective cleavages :

- The thesis of discontinuity seems to hold true for the worker-capital cleavage. Its formation is not finalized yet. The cleavage is ambiguous and latent (old, pre-socialist and dissolving cleavage).

- In Bulgaria and Romania, and also but much weaker in Slovenia and Hungary, there is a latent and very heterogeneous land-industry cleavage which is partly covered up by the worker-capital cleavage (traditional cleavage).

- The ideological cleavage is the most important factor on the societal level that is able to explain the voting behavior aside from rational decisions (new cleavage ; thesis of discontinuity, result of dissolving cleavage).

- Voting behavior that refers to the church-state cleavage is still strong if voters are strongly committed to their church (thesis of

condensing cleavages). The thesis of continuity seems to hold true for Hungary and Slovenia (traditional, condensing cleavage).

- There is a revival of the center-periphery cleavage in Romania that presents itself in terms of ethnicity (traditional cleavage since World War I; thesis of continuity; probably condensing at Romania).

There are some similarities in the development of cleavages between the countries in the sample: until 2000, the history of the church-state-cleavage in Slovenia and Hungary resembled that in Germany. In all Eastern European countries but Bulgaria, where a trend can be identified, there isn't any clear indication of how the labor-capital-cleavage will develop. The land-industry-cleavage shows the classical distinction in Eastern Europe; it is strong in Bulgaria, nascent in Romania, but weak in Hungary and Slovenia. The ethnic cleavage is strong in Romania and also in Bulgaria, a fact we could not present here. The ideological cleavage is dominant with the allocation expected from the Western theoretical model. It is not decreasing; on the contrary, it is going from strength to strength in Romania.

During the time span I investigated, two cleavages were of some importance for the decisions of Romanian voters – the ethnic cleavage and the ideological cleavage. Beyond those cleavages, there is a “no cleavage”-situation within the Romanian constituency. Romanian voters are individualistic and family oriented in solving problems. They don't look for any support outside of their families and there is no democratic tradition of allo-

cation and representation of societal interests as well as of intermediary groups co-operating with parties. After more than 40 years of a patrimonial regime (Kitschelt, 1999, 39) Romania lacks democratic experience and socialization. The younger generations seem to adopt a more pragmatic political style – candidate and issue voting – and slowly but steadily develop towards an independent democratic culture. Generally, Romanians, and especially the younger generations, show a cynical voting behavior which is oriented towards efficacy (in the sense of David Easton 1975) and personality of politicians (Precupețu, Precupețu 2004, 99). Several cleavages replace the classical ones to structure voting behavior: the latent cleavages of land-industry and of modernization winners and losers add to the “culture complex” discovered by Sandu (2004b). The culture complex is composed of individual characteristics like attitudes, personality and ideology and of political convictions like political fidelity (candidate orientation and consistent voting on local and national level), trust (in politician and institutions) and residence (rural or urban). It adds up to a cleavage-like societal conflict of reform, critique and modernity versus old structures, tradition and trust in politicians and institutions.

All results taken together, we cannot speak of a general “no future”-situation for cleavages in Romania. The societal conflicts are more complex than the structure offered by classical cleavages, and the floor is open to rational choice voting rather than a complex model of group representation.

Note

1. Regarding the cultural determination of theories of modernisation and democratisation in Eastern Europe see Fuchs, Klingemann (2000), Fuchs, Roller (1998).
2. I would like to thank Konstantin Baltz for translating the Romanian Data Set.
3. Compared to the components of the Human Development Index (life expectancy, literacy, education and GDP ppp) you get an acknowledged means to measure the socioeconomic development of any country.
4. If one could assume a strong periodical effect as it was the case in Germany in 1998, when the German voter voted against a government for the first time in German history after World War

II, then these elections are excluded in order not to distort the normal voting behavior by an extraordinary political situation.

5. Deviating from this order, single issue parties and parties of national minorities are always placed at the far right end of the table.
6. Ecological dealignment is defined by a decrease in number of a social group ; sectoral dealignment means a decrease in the individual's commitment to the social group (dealignment in a narrow sense ; Bürklin, Klein, 1998, 83).
7. Franklin, Mackie, Valen (1992, 18) assume that an affiliation exceeding minimal standards and a higher income are sufficient for the voters' adaptation to middle class values because their education and income qualify for middle class professions and qualifications.
8. The expert judgements Laver, Benoit (2006 : 281) used to form the left-right-scale of Romanian parties showed the following result in 2006 (1 point = left, 20 points = right) :

PSD	PUR	PD	PRM	PNTCD	UDMR	PNL
6,8	9,6	11,1	11,5	12,5	12,8	14,3

9. Romanians are in general more individualized than many other peoples (Voicu, 2005).
10. For this reason, I skipped the overall comparison. Germany hasn't got any national minority which is politically relevant on the national level. In Hungary, members of all minorities are co-opted to the parties. In Slovenia, Hungarians and Italians are allowed to vote for one candidate each to represent their interests in parliament.
11. Many Germans left the country after being invited to Germany by the German chancellor Helmut Kohl and many others were allowed to emigrate to Germany before, when the German administration paid some "economic aid" to Ceaușescu in the 1980s.
12. The ethnic cleavage is more significant as a conflict between the majority population of a region and the Roma population living there than as a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians (expert interview with Dumitru Sandu 30.3.2006).
13. It is still very important in the Netherlands ; it has been arising in Sweden for the last ten years, and it is also strong in Slovenia.
14. A positive correlation between church affiliation and voting for the conservative voting coalition CDR is caused by the fact that 80% of the Romanians are members of the Orthodox Church ; the CDR gained 30% of the votes in the 1996 national elections and became the strongest party in parliament. It was especially supported by the church and the church affiliated citizens. The effect broke down after the negative balance of the political and economic performance of the conservative government. In 2000, the CDR lost most of its support, except for 5% of the votes in the national election.
15. A Bulgarian peculiarity is the link between the ethnic cleavage and the urban-rural differences. The Muslim Turkish population lives mostly in small rural communities. By voting nearly unanimously for "their" party this group single-handedly produced an alternative to the urban parties of the Bulgarian titular nation.
16. Beyond the representation of workers the Romanian unions are not involved in social activities, they don't offer any ideological perspective. Again, the character of the PSD as a "Party of Power" without any commitment to society and without an underlying social democratic party platform becomes apparent (expert interview with Cristian Pîrvulescu 29.3.2006 and with Alfred Pfaller 31.3.2006).
17. In the Netherlands, the ideological cleavage follows the dividing lines of "verzuiling" which come along with a division between the Christian churches (right) and the social democratic unions (left). Socialism was also called a compensatory religion (Lukšič, 1996, 2003) an assumption which fits in the structure of the Dutch and Slovene society. The Swedish voters don't make their decisions according to ideological considerations only, the labor-capital-cleavage and, since the end of the 1990s, the church-state-cleavage, add to the effects of "Lagerbildung" (building up camps). In Spain, there are still some effects of the conflicts dating back to Franco's dictatorship and its transformation : The former opposition belongs to the secular, left political camp, the Franco-friendly parties belong to religious, right political

camp. The cleavage is strong ; all important national parties can be located in the ideological area of conflict.

18. Analysing the Public Opinion Barometer run in May 1999, Sandu (2004b: 999) offered alternative ideological structures which are deduced from the concept of political culture and cut across the left-right-scheme.

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**Appendix 1. Country Clusters according
to Phases of Modernization 1950-2000**

Results of a cluster analysis over four indicators of modernization : GDP, education, health and service sector.

Cluster Mean	Phase of Modernization 1	Phase of Modernization 2	Phase of Modernization 3	Phase of Modernization 4
GDP per capita US\$	4170,57	8106,09	13.269,52	18.669,17
Pupils at secondary and tertiary schools % of all pupils	17,77	26,00	37,17	44,70
Employees at service sector % of all employees	32,02	43,48	54,76	65,29
Infant Mortality % of 1000 children born alive	42,30	20,37	11,87	6,94
Cases years	344	355	260	193
Slovenia		1991-1994	1990 ; since 1995	
Czech Republic/CSFR	1950-1967	1968-1991 ; 1992-2000		
Hungary	1950-1977 ; 1991-1996	1978-1990 ; since 1997		
Slovakia/CSFR	1950-1967 ; 1993	1968-1992 ; since 1994		
Estonia		1991-1999	since 2000	
Bulgaria	1950-1978, 1980 ; 1990- 2000	1979, 1981- 1989		
Latvia	1992-1997	1991 ; since 1998		
Lithuania	1993-1998	1991-1992 ; since 1999		
Poland	1950-1996	since 1997		
Romania	1950-2000			
Switzerland		1950-1954	1955-1968	since 1969
Denmark		1950-1964	1965-1983	since 1984
Norway	1950-1953	1954-1971	1972-1983	since 1984
Austria	1950-1959	1960-1971	1972-1988	since 1989
Germany	1950-1955	1956-1969	1970-1987, 1990	1988-1989, since 1991

Sweden		1950-1964	1965-1984	since 1985
France	1950-1954	1955-1968	1969-1985	since 1986
Belgium	1950-1954	1955-1970	1971-1987	since 1988
Netherlands	1950-1952	1953-1967	1968-1987	since 1988
Italy	1950-1960	1961-1973	1974-1989	since 1990
Finland	1950-1959	1960-1972	1973-1987, 1991-1995	1988-1990, since 1996
United Kingdom		1950-1969	1970-1987	since 1988
Ireland	1950-1969	1970-1988	1989-1996	since 1997
Spain	1950-1969	1970-1987	1988-2000	
Greece	1950-1969	1970-1996	since 1997	
Portugal	1950-1971	1972-1989	since 1990	

Appendix 2. Countries, Phases of Modernization and Elections within the Analyses

Data : Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, University of Cologne (www.gesis.org/ZA/index.htm), Open Society Foundation at Romania (www.osf.ro/en/publicatii.php?id_cat=2), EVS=European Value Survey (wvs.isr.umich.edu/; www.europeanvalues.nl), CSES=Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.umich.edu/~cses/).

Country	Phase	Year	Data Source
Romania	1	1996, 1999, 2002, 2005	CSES 1996; Public Opinion Barometer 1999, 2002, 2005
Bulgaria	1	1999	EVS 1999
Hungary	1	1993	Pre-Election Studies 1993
	2	1999	EVS 1999
Slovenia	2	1992	Public Opinion 1992
	3	1999	Public Opinion 1999
Germany	1	1953	Election Study 1953 (Bundesstudie)
	2	1965	Election Study 1965
	3	1976	Election Study 1976
	4	2002	Election Study 2002

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